Plaintiff steel company filed suit against defendant corporation seeking damages for breach of an exclusive sales agency contract. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County entered judgment for corporation pursuant to jury verdict. Steel corporation then sought review of the trial court’s decision.
Steel corporation instituted the action against corporation after corporation notified steel corporation that it was no longer its exclusive sales representative. In its complaint, steel corporation alleged that corporation’s actions breached the parties exclusive sales agency contract. On appeal, steel corporation contended that it was the law of the case that defendant could not maintain that the contract was invalid because of steel corporation’s alleged prior breach of the contract. Furthermore, steel corporation maintained that it was the law of the case that the contract was not mutually abandoned. Corporation urged that only the issue as to the 10-day cancellation clause was determined on the prior appeal. The court held that law of the case applied to corporation’s prior breach defense and its mutually abandoned defense because those two defenses were raised in the first trial. Moreover, the court held that jury verdict in favor of corporation could not stand because the evidence, as a matter of law, was insufficient to show mutual abandonment. The court further held that the trial court’s mutual abandonment instruction amounted to a prejudicial error.
The court reversed and remanded the trial court’s decision to enter judgment in favor of corporation. A class action lawyer representing a litigant file notice of appearance during trial.
Appellants, girlfriend and her daughter, sought review of the judgment of dismissal without leave to amend entered by the Los Angeles Superior Court (California) against appellants’ first amended complaint on demurrers brought by respondent boyfriend to appellants’ claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Respondent boyfriend left a message on his son’s answering machine that alluded to his wish to book a flight for appellant girlfriend on an airline which had experienced a crash. After hearing the message, appellants, girlfriend and her daughter, sought to recover against respondent for intentional infliction of emotional distress. After the first amendment of their complaint, the trial court granted respondent’s demurrer and dismissed the complaint without leave to amend. On appeal, the court’s standard of review was to consider whether the facts pled by appellants stated a cause of action on any available legal theory. It held they did not and affirmed. Regardless of respondent’s intent, the alleged message was not so extreme or outrageous as to exceed all bounds usually tolerated in a civilized society, an essential element of the cause of action. Even considering the claim that this message was part of a pattern, the remarks attributed to respondent, separately or together, lacked specificity as to time, place, and context, and amounted only to peevish spleen-venting, and the steam of an irascible temper was not smoke from the fire of an actionable death threat.
The court affirmed the judgment of the trial court which sustained the demurrers of respondent boyfriend and dismissed without leave to amend the complaint of appellants, girlfriend and her daughter. Appellants failed to state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress because respondent’s conduct was not outrageous.